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THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
John Quigley*
INTRODUCTION
When President George Bush urged the U.S. Senate to consent to
the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Covenant), one might have expected him to say that ratifi-
cation would improve rights protection in the United States. Far
from that, Bush assured the Senate that ratification would require
no change in U.S. practice. By a written statement, he sought to
ensure that the Covenant would not be enforceable in U.S. courts.
Regarding issues on which the Covenant sets stricter standards than
U.S. law, he formulated reservations. Bush insulated the United
States from external scrutiny by refusing to ratify the Covenant's
separate protocol, which gives an individual the right to file a com-
plaint against a state.
Bush's message confirmed the opinion of some analysts that he
ratified merely to enhance U.S. stature for criticizing other states
for rights violations. The long-time U.S. refusal to ratify the Cove-
nant, drafted in 1966, was frequently cited by other states in re-
sponse to U.S. criticism.
The Senate gave consent to ratification on the terms proposed by
Bush. This Article examines the question of what reality the Cove-
nant has for the United States, particularly in the domestic arena. It
asks whether, despite Bush's and the Senate's intentions, the Cove-
nant constitutes law for U.S. courts.
I. GENESIS OF THE QUALIFICATION CLAUSES
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is the
product of extensive efforts made through the United Nations to
commit states to protect human rights. The effort began with the
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B. Harvard Law School 1966; M.A. Harvard
University 1966. The author is grateful for consultation to his colleague at the Ohio State Univer-
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U.N. Charter itself, which required states to work with the organi-
zation to promote rights.' The Charter did not, however, include a
listing of rights. The General Assembly in 1948 filled that void by
adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration),
which enumerated rights to be guaranteed by states to any individ-
ual, whether an alien or a citizen.2
The Declaration, however, as a resolution of the General Assem-
bly, did not create obligations binding on states.' The Assembly
next put the rights specified in the Universal Declaration into treaty
form, so that they would be binding. That effort resulted in the As-
sembly's adopting in 1966 the text of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights." In 1976, following the requisite number
of ratifications, the Covenant entered into force.5
Even though the United States had been a prime promoter of the
drafting process, it refused to sign the Covenant. In the United
States, there was considerable opposition to international scrutiny."
A U.S. delegate told the United Nations that the reason the United
States would not sign was that "persuasion, education and example
I. U.N. CHARTER arts. I, 55, 56.
2. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Res. 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
3. UN. CHARTER art. 10 ("The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters
within the scope of the present Charter . . . and . . . may make recommendations . . . on any
such questions or matters."). Given state practice since 1948, however, the Declaration is today
binding on states as reflecting customary norms of international law. Siderman de Blake v. Repub-
lic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the Universal Declaration is "a
powerful and authoritative statement of the customary international law of human rights"); Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that customary international law on
human rights is "evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"); see also
MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 272-74, 302, 325-30
(1980) (discussing the extent to which provisions of the Declaration have achieved status as cus-
tomary international law); Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Rights
Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 543, 570 n.182, 595-96, 611-18 (1989) (discussing instances where U.S. courts have
made reference to international human rights accords when deciding issues of domestic law);
Humphrey Waldock, Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of
the European Convention, 14 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. (supp. publication No. 11) at 15 (1965).
4. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the United States Sept. 8, 1992)
[hereinafter ICCPR]. The drafting took so long, in part, because the socialist States stressed
economic rights, while the Western States stressed political rights. As a result, the drafting split
into two tracks. Separate treaties were written for the two groups of rights. The other treaty was
called the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
6. Louis B. Sohn, United States Attitudes Toward Ratification of Human Rights Instruments,
20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 255, 260-61 (1990).
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would have more satisfactory results than formal undertakings,
which would lead to some countries imposing their social and moral
standards on others."" Only in 1977 did the United States sign the
Covenant, during the administration of President Jimmy Carter.
The Covenant requires ratification,' and under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the president may ratify only after Senate consent.9 President
Carter asked the Senate to give consent so that he could ratify.10
The Senate, however, did not act on the Covenant during Carter's
tenure. The Reagan Administration backed off seeking Senate ac-
tion," and as a result, the Covenant lay dormant in the Senate
through the 1980s.12 In 1991, President Bush urged the Senate to
take up the Covenant, 3 and he proposed to the Senate a package of
qualifying statements. 4 The qualifications were calculated to limit
U.S. obligations under the Covenant. Bush denominated five of
them "reservations."' 5 A reservation exempts a state from a particu-
7. U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., C.3, 812th mtg. at 250 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.812 (1957) (state-
ment of Mr. Meany, U.S.A.).
8. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 48, 999 U.N.T.S. at 185.
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. Remarks on Signing International Covenants on Human Rights, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1488 (Oct. 5, 1977). Under U.S. procedure, the person who deposits the instrument of ratifi-
cation is the president. The president negotiates a treaty and then, after consultation with the
Senate, puts it into force for the United States by ratifying it. The power to make treaties is found
in the U.S. Constitution in Article 11 (executive power), which gives the president "Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur ...." U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
11. According to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "the Reagan Administration did
not indicate any interest in ratifying the Covenant." SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.
REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. Doc.
No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992), reprinted in 31 1.L.M. 645, 649 (1992).
12. Unlike unadopted legislation, a submitted treaty does not "expire" at the end of a term of
Congress. Thus, the Senate remained seized of the Covenant during the years Reagan refrained
from seeking action on it. Craig H. Baab, The Process for United States Ratification of Human
Rights Instruments, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 265, 269 (1990).
13. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1I, at 25, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 660
(including the text of Letter from President Bush to Clairborne Pell, Chairman, Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations (Aug. 8, 1991)); Bush Urges Senate to Ratify U.N. Civil Rights Cove-
nant. Reuters AM Cycle, Sept. 10, 1991, available on LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt File.
14. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1I, at 2, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 660.
15. Id. at 11-12, reprinted in 31 1lL.M. at 653-54. The Committee report delineates the five
reservations: (1) that the Covenant's requirement to prohibit war propaganda and the advocacy of
national, racial, or religious hatred must be read consistent with the U.S. Constitution; (2) that,
contrary to the Covenant, the United States reserves the right to impose capital punishment on
persons who were under eighteen at the time of their crimes; (3) that the Covenant language on
cruel and degrading treatment or punishment is no broader than that concept as it appears in the
U.S. Constitution; (4) that the United States will not comply with the Covenant provision that
states that when new legislation reduces the penalty for crime, anyone currently under sentence
for the crime shall benefit from the new legislation; and (5) that the United States reserves the
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 42:1287
lar provision of a treaty and is considered legitimate, so long as the
reservation is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty. 6 Beyond the five reservations, the president denominated
other qualification statements as "understandings" and "declara-
tions."'1 7 These statements interpreted the Covenant, or explained
how the United States would carry out its obligations.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings and, by a
unanimous vote, reported the Covenant to the Senate, adding on a
"proviso" to give the U.S. Constitution priority over the Covenant.' 8
With the qualifying statements, the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions believed that the Covenant did not impose on the United
States standards any stricter in the protection of rights than those
currently found in U.S. law. The Committee stated that "[t]he over-
whelming majority of the provisions in the Covenant are compatible
with existing U.S. domestic law. In those few areas where the two
diverge, the Administration has proposed a reservation or other
form of condition to clarify the nature of the obligation being under-
taken by the United States."' 9
Not all senators agreed with all the qualifications,20 but more
than the requisite two-thirds voted their consent to ratification." On
right to treat juvenile offenders as adults, despite language in the Covenant that calls for separate
procedures and separate incarceration for juveniles.
16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 19,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). The determination
regarding what is compatible is left to the other part(ies) to the treaty. Id. arts. 20-23, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 337-38, 8 I.L.M. at 687-89. If a State Party accepts a reservation, it may so inform
the depositary agency, or it may remain silent, and the result is that the two (or more) States are
mutually bound by the treaty, except for the clause to which the reservation was entered. Id. art.
20, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337, 8 I.L.M. at 687. On the other hand, if another State Party finds a
particular reservation incompatible with the treaty, it may state its objection in writing. This
action, taken alone, still renders the treaty binding as between the two States, just as if the second
State had accepted the reservation. If, however, in its communication, the objecting State also
says that, as a result of the reservation, it does not consider itself in treaty relations with the
reserving State, then there are no obligations under the treaty between the two States. Id.
17. 138 CONG. REC. S4783-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
18. 138 CONG. REC. 54096 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1992); see U.N. Treaty, Americans' Rights,
WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1992, at C6 (asserting that ratification of the Covenant, even with its reser-
vations, will help increase U.S. participation and influence in the formulation of international
standards on political and human rights); see infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the proviso to the Covenant).
19. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 11, at 3, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 650.
20. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
21. Id. The vote was conducted by asking the senators to stand, and the chair ruled that more
than two-thirds had stood to indicate consent. Those who opposed certain qualifications yet voted
in favor did so apparently on the theory that it was better that the president ratify subject to the
qualifications than that he not ratify at all.
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June 1, 1992, President Bush signed the instrument of ratification, 2
and the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations deposited it with
the U.N. Secretary-General on June 8, 1992, bringing the treaty
into force for the United States on September 8, 1992.23
The Covenant does not represent the first U.S. subjection to inter-
national standards of human rights. The United States was already
bound by the international customary law of human rights.2 Cus-
tom is a body of international law found in no treaty yet binding on
states on the theory that the norms in question have been tacitly
accepted by states. 5 It was not always clear, however, precisely
which human rights issues were covered by customary norms. Tor-
ture, for example, was prohibited by customary law, but it was un-
clear whether many other basic rights, including freedom of expres-
sion, were covered. 26 The Covenant broadens the sphere of rights
the United States is bound to observe and, through its definitions of
rights, makes obligations more explicit.
Despite President Bush's assurances to the Senate, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may require changes
in rights protection in the United States. The right of privacy is
22. White House Statement on Signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1008 (June 5, 1992). President Bush remarked during the
signing ceremony that "I ...ratify and confirm the said Covenant, subject to the said reserva-
tions, understandings and declarations."
23. 3 U.S.*Dep't of State Dispatch (no. 45), Nov. 9, 1992; see also ICCPR, supra note 5, art.
48, 999 U.N.T.S. at 185 (designating the U.N. Secretary-General as the depositary agency for
the Covenant); id. art. 49, 999 U.N.T.S. at 185 (stating that the Covenant enters into force three
months after deposit of the instrument of ratification).
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; see David F. Klein, A Theory for the Application of the
Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332
(1988) (surveying the arguments for and against recognition of customary international law by
domestic courts); Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status
as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 65 n.14, 81-90 (1990) (asserting that
customary international law is part of the law of the United States).
25. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-12 (3d ed. 1979). See gen-
erally ANTHONY A. D'AMATO. THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971) (ex-
plaining the sources for and historical underpinnings behind customary international law); Paust,
supra note 24, at 59-67 (equating customary international law with the reasonable expectations of
mankind).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, § 702 (listing as the acts prohibited by customary
law: genocide, slavery, murder, causing disappearance, torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, or a
consistent pattern of gross violations of rights). But cf. id. § 702 cmt. a ("The list is not necessa-
rily complete, and is not closed: human rights not listed in this section may have achieved the
status of customary law, and some rights might achieve that status in the future."); Paust, supra
note 3, at 570-610 (discussing other rights protected under customary law).
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protected more explicitly in the Covenant than in U.S. law, a fact
that may have implications for the issues of abortion and gay
rights.27 The Covenant requires States Parties to "ensure the equal
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political
rights," 8 a provision that may put into U.S. law something
equivalent to the Equal Rights Amendment that has been much dis-
cussed in the United States but not put into force.
The Covenant contains extensive provisions on the criminal pro-
cess that may impact U.S. criminal trials29 on such issues as burden
of proof on defenses,3" the scope of criminal discovery,31 and the
exclusion from capital juries of persons opposed to capital punish-
ment. 2 The Covenant may also affect the U.S. practice of kidnap-
ping a suspect abroad for trial in the United States, 8 and it may
27. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 17, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173 ("No one shall be subjected to arbi-
trary or unlawful interference with his privacy. ... ); see also Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1981) (holding that the privacy right elucidated in the Covenant is
violated by sodomy statutes).
28. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179 ("All persons are equal before the law
and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground (including sex). ... )
29. See generally John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of United
States Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARV. HUM.
RTS J. 59 (1993).
30. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 14(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176-77 (stating that the accused has the
right to be presumed innocent); Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 144, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984) (explaining that the Covenant's guaran-
tee of presumption of innocence means that "the burden of proof of the charge is on the prosecu-
tion and the accused has the benefit of doubt"). The concept of construing doubt to the benefit of
the accused is taken in civil law States to require prosecution to carry the burden of persuasion on
defenses. See M.S. STROGOVICH. UCHENIE 0 MATERIAL'NOI ISTINE V UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE [A
Study on Material Truth in Criminal Procedure] 260 (1947); Jean Patarin, Le particularisme de
la thorie des preuves en droit pnal, in QUELQUES ASPECTS DE L'AUTONOMIE DU DROIT PtNAL 2,
14 (G. Stefani ed., 1956) ("This presumption [of innocence] logically is reflected in an allocation
of the burden of proof particularly favorable to the accused."); cf Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,
233-34 (1987) (holding that it is no violation of due process to require the accused in a murder
case to sustain the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence).
31. Report of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 30, at 145 (stating that, under the
Covenant, the accused is entitled to have "access to documents and other evidence which the
accused requires to prepare his case"). But cf FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 16 (providing less access to
prosecution information than is required in many other States).
32. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 14(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 (stating that an accused has the
right to be tried by an "impartial tribunal"). Compare Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968) (allowing the prosecution to exclude from a jury persons strongly opposed to capital pun-
ishment) with Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (stating that such an exclusion
produces "conviction-prone" juries).
33. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 9(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175 (prohibiting arbitrary detention); cf
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (permitting the trial in a U.S. court of
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require U.S. courts to refuse to extradite a person who is in danger
of being physically abused by authorities of the requesting state.3 4
II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE COVENANT ON THE INTERNATIONAL
PLANE
Beyond the question of coverage, the next important issue is how
Covenant rights are implemented. The Covenant is enforced at two
levels - the international and the domestic. At the international
level, the United States, like all States Parties, must file periodic
written reports with an eighteen-member Human Rights Committee
(Committee) established under the Covenant to monitor compli-
ance."6 This procedure exerts a certain pressure on states because
the Committee not only analyzes the reports but presses states for
answers regarding areas of questionable compliance.
In addition, the Covenant provides for complaints to the Human
Rights Committee by one state party against another. This proce-
dure applies only if both states have filed a declaration submitting
themselves to the Human Rights Committee. 6 When it ratified, the
United States filed such a declaration." As a result, other States
Parties that have also filed Article 41 declarations may file com-
a person kidnapped abroad at the behest of the U.S. government). See generally John Quigley,
Our Men in Guadalajara and the Abduction of Suspects Abroad: A Comment on United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 723 (1993) (criticizing the Supreme Court for ignor-
ing human rights violation involved in a kidnapping abroad).
34. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175 (prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment). See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 50 (1989) (holding
it a violation of a comparable European human rights treaty for the United Kingdom to extradite
to Virginia a person sought on a capital charge, since pre-execution incarceration in Virginia
would be cruel, inhuman, or degrading). See generally John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry
and the Impact of Human Rights on Extradition Law, 15 NC. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 401
(1990) (discussing U.S. case law where extraditees claim they will be physically abused if extra-
dited); Jordan J. Paust, Extradition and United States Prosecution of the Achille Lauro Hostage-
Takers: Navigating the Hazards, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235, 247-49 (1987).
35. ICCPR, supra note 5, arts. 28, 40, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, 181-82 (requiring reports from
States Parties); see Farrokh Jhabvala, The Practice of the Covenant's Human Rights Committee,
1976-82: Review of State Party Reports, 6 HuM. RTS. Q. 81, 95-104 (1984) (discussing reporting
requirements and implementation by States Parties); Dana D. Fischer, Note, Reporting Under the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The First Five Years of the Human Rights Committee,
76 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 144-53 (1982) (discussing the reporting requirements of Article 40).
36. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 41, 999 U.N.T.S. at 182-83.
37. The U.S. Ambassador to United Nations deposited the U.S. declaration June 8, 1992, pur-
suant to a corresponding declaration by the Senate "that the United States declares that it accepts
the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider communications under
Article 41 in which a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations
under the Covenant." 138 CONG. REC. S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
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plaints against the United States with the Committee. The Commit-
tee would hear the matter in a closed hearing with a right to the two
states to make oral and written submissions.3 8 The Committee
would then submit a report in writing. 9 The Covenant does not re-
quire a state to comply with the view of the Committee, but a report
by the Committee is strong evidence of what the Covenant requires.
While this procedure may seem to subject the United States to
substantial international scrutiny, the likelihood of filings against it
in fact is slight. As of 1992, only thirty-four states had filed an Arti-
cle 41 declaration. 40 Thus, the number of potential plaintiff States is
small. States are reluctant to jeopardize relations with other States
by filing complaints."' To date, not a single complaint has been filed
by one State Party against another.42
One other, and more serious, enforcement mechanism at the in-
ternational level is complaints to the Human Rights Committee by
individual persons. Individuals may file complaints against States
with the Committee. Before a State is subject to this procedure,
however, it must adhere to the Covenant's Optional Protocol (Proto-
col).4 '3 To date, sixty-five States are parties to the Protocol. 4 Unlike
the Article 41 mechanism, the Optional Protocol procedure has re-
sulted in numerous filings, and the Committee has developed an ex-
tensive body of case law.45
For the present, however, an individual may not file a complaint
against the United States before the Committee because the United
38. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 41, para. 1(d), (g), 999 U.N.T.S. at 182.
39. Id. art. 41, para. 1(h), 999 U.N.T.S. at 183.
40. As related to author by Treaty Section, U.N. headquarters, July 28, 1992. See also Report
of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 155, U.N. Doc. A/
44/40 (1989).
41. See John P. Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth
Century, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS 75, 86-87 (Maar-
ten Bos ed., 1973) (noting the reluctance of States Parties to file a complaint which might jeop-
ardize friendly relations); see also Scott Leckie, The Inter-State Complaint Procedures in Inter-
national Human Rights Law: Hopeful Prospects or Wishful Thinking?, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 249,
253-54 (1988) (identifying "political and economic considerations" as a major source of "the re-
luctance among states to utilize inter-state complaint procedures").
42. P.R. Ghandhi, The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communica-
tion, 57 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 201, 204 (1986); Leckie, supra note 41, at 266, 303.
43. ICCPR, supra note 5, Optional Protocol, 999 U.N.T.S. at 302 [hereinafter Optional
Protocol].
44. Confirmed to author by Treaty Section, U.N. headquarters, July 28, 1992.
45. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, Se-
lected Decisions Under the Optional Protocol (Second to Sixteenth Sessions), U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/OP/I (1985) (a collection of 31 opinions of the Committee).
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States did not ratify the Protocol. President Bush did not mention
the Protocol when he submitted the Covenant to the Senate, and the
United States has not explained why it did not adhere to the Proto-
col. For whatever reasons, the United States is unwilling to allow
itself to be brought before the Human Rights Committee by persons
alleging rights violations.
The U.S. concern about individual complaints is exaggerated. The
Human Rights Committee has developed a reputation for compe-
tence and objectivity.46 Although the Committee does not shrink
from insisting on rights when States violate them, its approach has
been one of moderation. In a case from Finland, the complainant
was convicted of smuggling hashish into Finland. 7 He claimed that
the Finnish court used unreliable evidence, in particular testimony
from a mentally disturbed co-defendant who retracted his testimony
during trial. 8 The Committee found no violation by Finland, how-
ever, stating "that the assessment of evidentiary material is essen-
tially a matter for the courts and authorities of the State party con-
cerned" and that the Committee "is not an appellate court."' 9
The Committee, moreover, has no enforcement power. A State
against which a complaint is filed must respond to the Committee in
writing, 50 but there is no hearing involving the complainant and the
State.51 The Committee publishes its decisions in an annual compi-
lation, and that may embarrass a State that has violated a right.
But a State is not required under the Optional Protocol to follow the
Committee's decision.
As a result of the United States' failure to adhere to the Optional
Protocol, the enforcement of the Covenant against it at the interna-
tional level will be modest. The United States will make periodic
reports to the Human Rights Committee, which, in turn, will press
the United States for explanations. There will be no complaints
against the United States by individuals and few, if any, by States.
The lack of significant international enforcement means that if the
46. Ghandhi, supra note 42, at 214, 249-50.
47. J.H. v. Finland, comm. no. 300/1988, Report of the Human Rights Committee, supra note
40, at 298.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 299.
50. Optional Protocol, supra note 43, art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 303.
51. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 2, para. 3, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174 ("The Committee shall hold
closed meetings when examining communications ....").
12951993]
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Covenant is to have any substantial impact, it will have to be in
U.S. courts.
III. DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT OF THE COVENANT
The second level of enforcement of the Covenant is domestic. The
Covenant requires self-policing by each State Party. In Article 2,
the parties agree "[t]o ensure that any person whose rights or free-
doms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective rem-
edy,"" that rights shall be "determined by competent judicial, ad-
ministrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent
authority provided for by the legal system of the State,"5 and that
the State shall "develop the possibilities of judicial remedy.""' Since
the United States has no legislative or administrative mechanism
available to individuals, the only possible remedy is judicial.
Thus, as applied to the United States, paragraph 3 of Article 2
requires that the courts ensure observance of the Covenant.55 This
means, at a minimum, that a court may not permit prosecution and
conviction for an act protected under the Covenant, and that a court
may entertain a suit by a person whose Covenant rights are violated
and provide injunctive and compensatory relief.5"
A key mechanism for construing treaty provisions is the practice
of States in implementing it.57 If States routinely apply a treaty pro-
vision in a certain fashion, that is evidence of what they intended."
Importantly, no State Party to the Covenant has formulated a quali-
fying statement like that of the United States to preclude applica-
52. Id. art. 2, para. 3(a), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
53. Id. art. 2, para. (3)(b), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
54. Id.
55. This means both state and federal courts. By virtue of the power over foreign affairs vested
in the federal government by the Constitution, the states are obliged to conform to treaties to
which the United States is a party. Thus, state courts must enforce Covenant rights.
56. See William M. Walker, Note, The Remedies of Law of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Current Trends and a Conceptual Framework for the Future, 20
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 525, 530-37 (1988) (asserting that States Parties are obliged to afford
declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory remedies where necessary). Walker reviews reports of
the Human Rights Committee which also declare that States must provide compensation and
injunctive relief as appropriate to remedy violations. Id. at 540-42. See generally Paust, supra
note 3, at 611-28 (discussing the right to a private remedy for deprivation of rights under interna-
tional law).
57. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, art. 31, para. 3(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M. at 692.
58. LORD McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 424-29 (1961).
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tion of the Covenant in its courts. 9
The Human Rights Committee, in inquiring of States about their
implementation of the Covenant, routinely asks questions aimed at
ensuring that the Covenant is used before the courts." Thus, the
Committee evidently believes that the courts of States Parties are
required to use the Covenant as domestic law. States have generally
replied in the affirmative to such inquiries. States Parties report that
the Covenant is cited before their courts as a basis for establishing a
right and that their courts rely on the Covenant as a basis for
rights. 1 For instance, the Netherlands reported, in 1989, that fifty-
eight judgments in Dutch courts had referred to provisions of the
Covenant during 1986 and that the Covenant created rights enforce-
able in Dutch courts." The Human Rights Committee has stated
that in the Netherlands, "any legislative act contrary to a provision
of the Covenant would become inapplicable."6 8
Italy replied that, under its constitution, treaties become domestic
law without specific adoption, but that the Covenant had nonethe-
less been adopted into domestic law by specific legislation of the
Italian parliament." It said that provisions of the Covenant are fre-
quently invoked by Italian courts. 5
France reported in 1988 that its courts had relied on the Cove-
nant in about twenty decisions.66 Japan reported that under its con-
stitution, treaty provisions prevail over domestic legislation before
Japanese courts, and that this rule applies to the Covenant.67
IV. THE UNITED STATES DECLARATION ON SELF-EXECUTION
President Bush and the Senate, in connection with ratification,
appended to the Covenant a "declaration" that Articles 1 to 27 are
59. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31
DECEMBER 1991 at 132-42, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/10, U.N. Sales No. E.92.V.4 (1992).
60. See, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 40, at 12 (question ad-
dressed to Norway); id. at 21 (question addressed to Mexico); id. at 44 (question addressed to the
Netherlands); id. at 121-22 (question addressed to Italy).
61. Cindy A. Cohn, The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes Related to the Human
Rights Committee and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 13 HuM. Rrs. Q. 295, 316-20
(1991).
62. Id. at 316.
63. Report of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 40, at 44.
64. Id. at 121.
65. Id. at 122.
66. Report of the Human Rights Committee. U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 83,
U.N. Do. A/43/40 (1988).
67. Id. at 137.
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not self-executing. 8 These articles are the provisions that impose
obligations on States. "The intent," explained the Foreign Relations
Committee, "is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private
cause of action in U.S. courts. . . . [E]xisting U.S. law generally
complies with the covenant; hence implementing legislation is not
contemplated. " 69 This prescription potentially jeopardizes domestic
enforcement of the Covenant in the United States.
Only once before has the Senate included a similar declaration in
its resolution of consent to a treaty, doing so in 1990 when approv-
ing the Convention on Torture.7 0 The Convention on Torture, how-
ever, has yet to be ratified by the president, and thus the question of
whether the treaty's operative provisions are self-executing has not
reached the courts.
The Senate, by including this "declaration" on non-self-execution,
has implicitly asserted a power to determine that treaty provisions
are not self-executing. However, this is a function normally exer-
cised by the courts, which decide whether a particular treaty, or a
particular treaty provision, is one that grants rights enforceable
before the court.7 The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States reflects U.S. Supreme Court practice on
the matter: "Whether an international agreement of the United
States is or is not self-executing is finally determined as a matter of
interpretation by courts in the United States if the issue arises in
litigation. ' 72
If a litigant claims a right under a treaty in a federal or state
court, the court decides whether the treaty is one that gives the liti-
68. 138 CONG. REC. S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
69. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 11, at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
657.
70. 136 CONG. REC. S17,492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (declaring portions of the Convention on
Torture to be non-self-executing).
71. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (holding that "[o]ur Constitution
declares a treaty to be the law of the land. . . . to be regarded in Courts of Justice as equivalent
to an Act of the Legislature, whenever it operates itself without the aid of any Legislative provi-
sion," but noting that some treaties do not operate of themselves); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing
Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 767 (1988) (noting that the class of treaties which the Foster
Court describes as not operating of themselves was limited to those treaties which by their own
terms are not self-executing). See generally Stephen A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The
Scope of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 571, 608-09 (1991) (commenting on the role of courts in interpreting treaties and declara-
tions that are not self-executing).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 154(l)
(1965).
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gant an enforceable right. The determination entails an assessment
of whether the treaty appears to confer a right on the person claim-
ing it. If, for example, a treaty between the United States and an-
other State grants citizens of both States a right to engage in com-
merce in the territory of the other, and a citizen of the other State is
subjected to discrimination in starting a business in the United
States, that person will likely by permitted to sue in either a state or
federal court in reliance on the treaty provision. In one such case, a
U.S.-Japan treaty granted mutual rights to engage in commerce on
the same terms as citizens, but a Seattle ordinance limited the issu-
ance of licenses for the pawnbroking business to U.S. citizens. The
Japanese citizen sued the city of Seattle in state court, claiming that
Seattle had violated his right under the treaty. When the case
reached the U.S. Supreme Court, it ruled that the treaty provision
granting rights in commerce gave the Japanese citizen a right to
start a pawnbroking business, despite the Seattle ordinance. 3
In determining whether a treaty is self-executing, the courts ask
whether the intent of the parties was to confer rights on individuals.
In an early case, the issue was whether a U.S.-Spain treaty provi-
sion on land grants given by the Spanish government in Florida
prior to Spain's cession of Florida to the United States could be
used by the grantees to claim title to land.74 The Supreme Court
looked to the intent of Spain and the United States on the matter as
reflected in the treaty and concluded that "the security of private
property was intended by the parties . . . .,, Since the quieting of
land titles in Florida apparently was an aim of Spain and the
United States, the Court recognized the title given by Spain. 76
In this and later cases, the Court developed a doctrine that came
to be known as that of "self-executing treaties." To treaty provisions
that operated in themselves to create rights, the Court contrasted
treaty provisions that contain "words of contract," meaning that the
parties were agreeing to take future action that remained executory
at the time of concluding the treaty.77 This approach was a marked
departure from that of British courts, which found treaties to be
effective as domestic law only if implemented by parliament by spe-
73. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
74. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 82 (1833).
75. Id. at 88.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U.S. 707, 727 (1887); Burgess v. Gray, 57 U.S. 48 (16
How.) 48, 50-52 (1856).
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cial legislation.7 1 In the United States, however, the Constitution in-
cluded a provision that treaties should be the "supreme law of the
land," a phrase that has come to be called the Supremacy Clause.7 9
On the basis of this provision, the Supreme Court decided that trea-
ties create law binding on the courts, but with the qualification that
the parties must have so intended.80
In a more recent case, the Federal Court of Appeals elaborated
on the test for "self-executing treaties" as follows:
The extent to which an international agreement establishes affirmative and
judicially enforceable obligations without implementing legislation must be
determined in each case by reference to many contextual factors: the pur-
poses of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the existence of domes-
tic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and the im-
mediate and long-range social consequences of self- or non-self-execution. 81
The court of appeals had before it a provision in the trusteeship
treaty for Saipan that guaranteed inhabitants against the loss of
lands or resources. Inhabitants objected to the planned construction
of a hotel that had been approved by the government of Saipan,
arguing that the hotel complex would negatively impact the environ-
ment. 2 The court decided that the treaty aimed to protect the envi-
ronment of Saipan on behalf of the inhabitants, and thus that the
inhabitants had a cause of action to challenge the construction.8"
V. THE SELF-EXECUTING CHARACTER OF THE COVENANT
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights falls
into the category of treaties that the courts have called "self-execut-
ing." The parties clearly intend that the various rights guaranteed
should inure to the benefit of individual persons. That, to be sure, is
the only reason for a treaty on human rights. A human rights treaty
confers rights on individuals. It is not merely a promise by States to
promote rights, but a promise to protect rights in the concrete, in
any situation where they are jeopardized.
78. BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 49-50.
79. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
80. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 82; see also Burgess, 57 U.S. at 50 (noting that although
the words "shall be ratified and confirmed" presage some future legislative act, parties could actu-
ally intend that they could ratified and confirmed by "force of the instrument itself").
81. Saipan v. United States Department of the Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974).
82. Id. at 93-94.
83. Id. at 98.
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The proper result will be for the courts to resolve that the pre-
scriptive provisions of the Covenant are self-executing. In 1950, in
Sei Fujii v. State,8 a California appellate court decided that the
human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter were self-executing, in
a case where a Japanese citizen challenged a California law requir-
ing escheat to the state of land owned by aliens."' The Supreme
Court of California reversed, finding those provisions too vague to
create rights enforceable in a court of law.86
The U.N. Charter contains no specific delineation of rights but
merely calls on States to promote the observance of human rights.8 7
The Covenant, however, gives specific definitions of rights. Thus, the
obstacle to a finding of the self-executing character of the U.N.
Charter provisions on human rights is not present in the Covenant.
There is no reason that a court, state or federal, should not deter-
mine that the rights specified in the Covenant are enforceable in
litigation before it.
The United States Senate, by its declaration that the Covenant
was not to be self-executing, purported to preempt this question,
presumably for both the federal and the state courts. If valid and
binding on the courts, the declaration would put the United States
in violation of its obligations under the Covenant. That fact should
weigh heavily on the courts when they address the question of
whether the Covenant is self-executing. A court cannot lightly pre-
sume that the United States adhered to the Covenant in such a way
that it would be violating it. A State adhering to a treaty has an
obligation to fulfill its obligations in good faith.88
The fact that the Senate consented on condition of the declaration
might seem to cast doubt on the validity of the consent. The Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
declares:
Since the President can make a treaty only with the advice and consent of
84. 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950), rev'd, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
85. Id. at 486 (stating that the Charter is supreme law of the land under the Supremacy
Clause).
86. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. 1952) (striking down a statute on the grounds
that it violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); see
Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights: From Jurisprudential Inquiry to Effective Litigation, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 227, 239-42 (1981) (discussing grounds for contemporary elimination of the two bases of
the Sei Fujii rationale).
87. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55, 56.
88. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339, 8
I.L.M. at 690.
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the Senate, he must give effect to conditions imposed by the Senate on its
consent. The President generally includes a verbatim recitation of any pro-
posed reservation, statement of understanding, or other declaration relevant
to the application or interpretation of the treaty contained in the Senate
resolution of consent, both in the instrument notifying the other state or the
depositary of United States ratification or accession and in the proclamation
of the treaty. 9
If the condition was found invalid, the court would have to decide
whether the consent was valid. A decision by a court that Articles 1
to 27 are self-executing, however, would not impair the validity of
the Senate's consent. 90 Once a treaty is ratified by the president fol-
lowing a Senate resolution of consent, the United States is bound
and the treaty is the "law of the land." If one were to assume that
the Senate has a power to impose conditions on its consent, the
treaty would nonetheless be binding on the United States. Interna-
tional law follows a rule comparable to the ultra vires rule in corpo-
ration law to protect other States Parties. Under this rule, a state is
bound by a treaty despite an internal defect in the process leading to
its adherence, unless the defect was obvious and fundamental.
A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding com-
petence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation
was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental
importance.9'
Here the defect, if it be such, is hardly "manifest." The question
of the effect of the invalidity of a condition imposed by the Senate is
uncertain as a matter of U.S. law. From the standpoint of other
States Parties, the matter is even more opaque.
VI. DETERMINING WHETHER THE DECLARATION REGARDING
SELF-EXECUTION HAS LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE
Simply from the formal standpoint, moreover, the validity of the
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, § 314 cmt. b (1987).
90. Power Auth. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The Power
Authority court cited in support of its decision New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1
(1898), in which the Supreme Court held that the Senate's consent to a treaty with the American
Indians was effective, even though the Senate never attached amendments to the treaty which
were therefore not part of the treaty. Id. at 22-24; see also Belilos Case, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
A) at 28 (1988) (holding that the invalidity of a declaration that was tantamount to a reservation
did not affect Switzerland's adherence to a European human rights treaty).
91. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, art. 46, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343, 8
I.L.M. at 697.
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declaration on non-self-execution is doubtful. The declaration is not
part of the treaty. What is "law" under the Supremacy Clause is
the "treaty." A treaty includes the text of the treaty, as qualified by
any reservations. Additional statements are not part of the treaty
and thus are not "law" under the Supremacy Clause. 2
"Declaration" is a category not unknown to international law in
this context. States sometimes "declare" in a way that constitutes a
reservation." The style of presentation of the U.S. statements, made
in the Senate consent to ratification and included by President Bush
when ratifying the Covenant, suggests that the United States did
not consider the statement on non-self-execution to be a reservation.
Paragraph I was called "reservations," Paragraph II "understand-
ings," and Paragraph III "declarations." President Bush and the
Senate thus did not consider the "understandings" or "declarations"
to be reservations.
That leaves the question of what legal effect such statements may
have. The authors of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States opine that such statements have a
binding effect as domestic law in U.S. courts, on the rationale that
they are conditions to the Senate's consent, and that the consent is
constitutionally required. 4 There is, however, little case law on the
matter, and none to back the Restatement view.
In the only decided case on point, Power Authority v. Federal
Power Commission,9 the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that a qualification statement, other than a res-
ervation, made by the Senate in a resolution of consent had no force
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, § Ill cmt. b ("A rule of international law or a
provision of an international agreement derives its status as law in the United States from its
character as an international legal obligation of the United States."); see also id. § 314, cmt. b
("If a treaty is ratified or acceded to by the United States with a reservation effective under the
principles stated in § 313, the reservation is part of the treaty and is law of the United States.").
93. Consider, for instance, a statement by France regarding the Covenant, wherein it "declares
that article 13 cannot derogate" from certain provisions of French law. This seems to be a reserva-
tion because France was saying that its domestic law would prevail. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES
DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, supra note 59, at 136; see also MCNAIR, supra note
58, at 158 ("It is not easy to distinguish from a Reservation a 'Declaration'....").
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, § 303 cmt. d ("The Senate may also give its con-
sent on conditions that do not require change in the treaty but relate to its domestic application,
e.g., that the treaty shall not be self-executing. ... ); see also Louis Henkin, The Treaty Mak-
ers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1176-77 (1956)
(stating that a Senate condition that is not part of the treaty can nonetheless be valid as domestic
law).
95. 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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as domestic law.96 The dispute in Power Authority involved a U.S.
treaty with Canada that regulated electrical power generation on
the St. Lawrence River, and whether the U.S. share of the power
could be allocated by the State of New York. The Senate had de-
clared, in a statement accompanying its consent to ratification of the
treaty, that the power accruing to the United States under the
treaty could be allocated only by act of Congress.97 The court of
appeals held that this statement had no effect on the allocation deci-
sions of the State of New York because the statement was not a
reservation to the treaty.98 It reasoned that the only way such a
qualification could have the force of law would be as part of the
treaty, since a treaty becomes the "law of the land" under the
Supremacy Clause.99 The court concluded that since a qualification
statement other than a reservation is not part of the treaty, the Sen-
ate's statement was not the "law of the land."100
VII. THE OBLIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO USE THE
COVENANT TO CONSTRUE RIGHTS
The meaning of the Senate declaration that the Covenant is not
self-executing is far from clear. It is not obvious that by the declara-
tion President Bush or the Senate meant to preclude reliance upon
the Covenant by U.S. courts. Under the principles enunciated in
Power Authority, had the Senate intended to exclude application of
the Covenant in U.S. courts, it would need to enter a reservation to
Article 2 of the Covenant.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as indicated previously,
explained that the declaration meant only that no private cause of
action could be based on the Covenant.101 Thus, the declaration may
mean only that a litigant suing the United States may not assert
that federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction based on the
96. Id. at 543-44.
97. Id. at 539.
98. Id. at 543-44.
99. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
100. According to the Supreme Court, Congress has the power to alter treaty obligations by
subsequent legislation, at least as regards their effect in courts of the United States. Under this
premise, Congress could pass a statute stating that the Covenant is not to be enforced as law in
federal courts. It might also have a similar power to impose such a qualification upon state courts.
Such legislation, however, would place the United States in violation of its Article 2(3) obligation
under the Covenant. Nevertheless, according to the Supreme Court, it would be domestically ef-
fective legislation.
101. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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Covenant. The Senate may have intended to exclude from the juris-
diction of federal courts cases in which the Covenant would serve as
the basis for a right.
A person who holds rights under a treaty to which the United
States is a party, and who alleges that the United States has vio-
lated those rights, may sue the United States in a federal district
court. 102 Such jurisdiction is provided by the federal code, which
states, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.""0 3 Interpreting the Senate declaration on self-execu-
tion in the context of federal statutory law, it is possible to conclude
that the Senate meant to exclude the Covenant from the statutory
definition of "treaty" for purposes of jurisdiction.
Thus, even if the declaration has legal significance, it would not
bar a litigant who is asserting a constitutional right from relying on
the Covenant for support. For example, a person convicted of sod-
omy who challenges the conviction in a state or federal court as a
violation of privacy rights would be able to rely on the Covenant's
privacy provision, and the court would apply that provision as the
"law of the land." The Covenant is applied in this fashion by the
courts of a number of States Parties, particularly those of the com-
mon law world, where incorporation of treaties into domestic law is
not the rule.
In the United Kingdom, although the Covenant has not been
transformed by Parliament into domestic law, 0 4 lawyers invoke the
Covenant in seeking to establish rights, and British courts have used
the Covenant as a basis for finding rights. 10 5 Australia presents a
parallel situation. Both Australia and the United Kingdom do not
deem treaties to be domestic law, and neither state has a Bill of
Rights. 0 "6 However, as in the United Kingdom, courts in Australia
view the Covenant as applicable in determining the content of
102. Bodemfiller v. United States, 39 F. 437, 439 (W.D. La. 1889).
103. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1992).
104. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 1992 Q.B. 770, 827 (opinion of
Butler-Sloss, L.J.). In the United Kingdom, which has no rule comparable to Article VI of the
U.S. Constitution that would make treaties the "law of the land," a treaty does not become do-
mestic law unless explicitly transformed into domestic law by an act of parliament.
105. Id. at 894 (holding that the Covenant applies in determining the scope of free speech in
the United Kingdom); see also Cohn, supra note 61, at 319-20 (discussing generally the use of the
Covenant in the United Kingdom).
106. Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 153 C.L.R. 168, 224-25 (1982) (Austl.) (stating that a
treaty becomes domestic law in Australia only if an implementing statute is adopted).
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rights.10 7 In Canada, the Ontario High Court used Article 14(3) of
the Covenant, which details the right to be informed of the criminal
charges, to construe the Canadian Charter provision on a similar
right. 0 8
Given the Article 2 obligation to enforce domestically the provi-
sions of the Covenant, even if United States courts were to rule the
Covenant not to be self-executing, they should apply it in the deter-
mination of constitutional rights. U.S. courts have, in fact, used the
Covenant in this way even prior to ratification.'09
If U.S. courts apply the Covenant in this fashion, they would
maintain fidelity to the proposition that the Senate intended not to
permit a litigant to file a case based solely on the Covenant."0 How-
ever, U.S. courts would still be giving the Covenant a certain degree
of domestic enforcement. In order to comply with Article 2 of the
Covenant, the United States must afford that right.
VII. THE HELMS PROVISO
Another qualification statement affecting U.S. obligations under
the Covenant is a "proviso" entered by the Senate in its resolution
of consent, stating, "Nothing in this Covenant requires or authorizes
legislation, or other action, by the United States of America prohib-
ited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the
United States." ' The "proviso" was not proposed by President
Bush but was added by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
107. Mabo v. Queensland, 107 A.L.R. 1 (1992) (Austl.). On the use of the Covenant in Com-
monwealth courts, see Papers of the Judicial Colloquium. Balliol College. Oxford, 21-23 Sep-
tember 1992 (Commonwealth Secretariat & Interights 1993).
108. Re Warren, 35 C.R. 3d 173, 177 (1983); see Walter S. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Expe-
rience with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Seen from the Perspective of
a Former Member of the Human Rights Committee, 20 AKRON L. REV. 611, 627 (1987).
109. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988) (citing the Covenant's
prohibition on the execution of juveniles in the course of a decision finding it unconstitutional to
execute one who was fifteen years of age at time of offense); Gordon A. Christenson, Using
Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CtN. L. REv. 3,
4-5 (1983); Farooq Hassan, The Doctrine of Incorporation: New Vistas for the Enforcement of
International Human Rights?, 5 HuM. RTs. Q. 68, 83-84 (1983); Louis Henkin, Rights: American
and Human. 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 413-20 (1979); Paust, supra note 3, at 609-11.
110. Since the Covenant does not contain rights for which there is no analogue in U.S. constitu-
tional law, the issue may never be litigated. It would seem that almost any plaintiff who desires to
rely on a Covenant right could base the action on a provision of a state constitution or the Federal
Constitution.
111. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 11, at 24, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
660.
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a motion by Senator Jesse Helms.112 The Foreign Relations Com-
mittee suggested that the president not communicate the proviso to
the U.N. Secretary-General when he deposited the instrument of
ratification, on the rationale that the issue of the relationship be-
tween the Covenant and the Constitution was a domestic matter. 113
President Bush followed this suggestion and did not communicate
the proviso to the Secretary-General.11
The intent of the proviso evidently was to ensure that, even apart
from those provisions to which other qualification statements were
made, the United States would not consider itself bound by any pro-
vision of the Covenant that differed from those contained in the
U.S. Constitution. It thus appears to exempt the United States from
the obligation to protect a right more broadly than it is protected by
the U.S. Constitution.
Senator Daniel Moynihan objected to a comparable proviso en-
tered by the Senate in its resolution of consent to the Convention on
Torture in 1990.115 Moynihan said that the proviso created confu-
sion as to U.S. obligations: "It says to every other nation in the
world that they must figure out for themselves whether we adhere to
a particular provision or not. It purports to condition every provision
of the entire treaty on the entire corpus of constitutional
jurisprudence."11
The Human Rights Committee would clearly not be bound by the
proviso if another state party filed a complaint against the United
States under the Article 41 procedure, because the proviso was not
denominated a reservation and was not communicated to the secre-
tary-general. Thus, the proviso has no relevance to the United
States' international obligations under the Covenant.
The Senate, by its proviso on the Covenant, may have intended
only to limit U.S. obligations internally. On one reading, the proviso
might be taken as a reaffirmation of the U.S. reservation to Article
20, exempting the United States from the obligation to outlaw "hate
112. Id. at 3, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 649.
113. 138 CONG. REC. S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Pell).
114. White House Statement on Signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 22.
115. 136 CoNG. REC. S17,489 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
116. Id.; see also Letter from Lawyers Committee for Human Rights to Senator Clairborne
Pell, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dec. 10, 1991 (stating that the proviso on




speech." '117 Such legislation would be in violation of the U.S. Consti-
tution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. If read more
broadly, the proviso would mean that, at least domestically, the
Covenant would require no more rights protection than that pro-
vided under domestic constitutional law. On this latter interpreta-
tion, the proviso would be duplicative of the declaration regarding
the self-executing character of the Covenant.
Another possible reading of the proviso is that it protects individ-
uals from a loss of their constitutional rights by virtue of the Cove-
nant. This again would have particular relevance to Article 20,
which protects speech rights less rigorously than U.S. constitutional
law. Objecting to the comparable proviso in the Convention on Tor-
ture, Senator Moynihan said that he thought the proviso unneces-
sary, because the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled, as a mat-
ter of U.S. constitutional law, that an individual who enjoys a
constitutional right may not be deprived of it by treaty. 1 Moyni-
han cited Reid v. Covert," 9 in which the Court said that the right to
trial by jury in a criminal case could not be defeated by an interna-
tional agreement that called for dependents of U.S. service person-
nel abroad to be tried by court-martial, where jury trial would not
be available.' 20
Senator Moynihan thought that this qualification had no legal ef-
fect. Pointing out that it did not alter U.S. obligations to other
States Parties, he said that the Senate "is simply stating a constitu-
tional truism."1'' Whatever its meaning, the proviso should not be
read to affect U.S. obligations under the Covenant, either interna-
tionally or domestically. Moreover, the proviso is not the "law of the
land," because it was not incorporated as part of the treaty or a
reservation to it.122
IX. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COVENANT FOR THE UNITED
STATES
The United States has played a significant role in the develop-
117. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2358 (1992) (holding that "hate speech" is a
protected form of public discourse, reasoning that the marketplace of ideas demands varying view-
points in order to reach the truth).
118. 136 CONG. REC. S17,490 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
119. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
120. Id. at 7-8.
121. 136 CONG. REC. S17,490 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
122. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
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ment of human rights. Its Bill of Rights influenced the development
of human rights worldwide. The human rights that emerged as in-
ternational law in the twentieth century owe a considerable debt to
the U.S. Bill of Rights and to cases decided under it by the U.S.
Supreme Court. It thus seems anomalous that once these rights are
affirmed in a solemn document like the Covenant, the United States
should seek to protect itself.
The aim of the Bush Administration was evidently to improve the
ability of the United States to criticize other states. However, by
accepting the Covenant in such limited fashion, the United States
fails in that objective. Others understand the limitations on U.S. ac-
ceptance, and thus the U.S. moral standing to raise human rights
criticisms against others is not improved, and, if anything, is dimin-
ished. Others will view the U.S. action as a public relations effort
rather than an assumption of obligations.
The Clinton Administration, of course, is not bound by the view
of the Bush Administration. It should ask the Senate to consent to
ratification of the Optional Protocol. 123 It should repudiate the Bush
view that the Covenant's operative provisions are not self-executing.
It should, moreover, do so quickly, before a case reaches the courts
on the matter. The change in administration should, in any event,
make the matter easier for the courts. To decide that the Covenant
is self-executing, the courts will not have to take a stand opposite to
that of the Bush Administration. Thus, even if the Clinton Adminis-
tration is silent on the issue, the way to a proper result in the courts
is eased.
What is most important in regard to the Covenant is that rights
be protected. The Covenant is an important tool in that respect. If
the result is a highly limited view of the Covenant's applicability,
U.S. litigants will have fewer options to enforcing rights than per-
sons in many other States. Canadian Indians, for example, have
taken cases to the Human Rights Committee under the Optional
Protocol on such matters as autonomy and status.124 If the Covenant
is enforced narrowly for the United States, American Indians will
not have similar access.
123. See supra note 12 (stating that unlike conventional legislation, treaties do not expire if
they are not consented to by the Senate before a legislative sessions ends).
124. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 166,
U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) (claim by Indian woman that her automatic loss, under Canadian
law, of status as Indian upon marrying non-Indian violated the Covenant).
1993] 1309
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The U.S. courts have a major role to play in implementing the
Covenant. Domestic enforcement is the heart of the Covenant's im-
plementation process. Few cases go to the Human Rights Commit-
tee, but domestic courts deal daily with rights issues. Regarding do-
mestic enforcement of the Covenant, U.S. courts should apply
traditional jurisprudence on self-execution to find that the Covenant
is the "law of the land" in the United States.
